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Digital diplomacy is the latest technological advance to
pushchange indiplomaticpractice. It relates to theapplica-
tionofdigital technologies, includinginformationandcom-
munication technologies, software engineering and big
data,andartificial intelligence, to thepracticeofdiplomacy.
Positioned in the top ranks of connectivity, internet
speed, smartphone ownership, and social media usage,
South Korea should be a leader in the use of digital
technologies in diplomatic practice. However, South
Korea is not a leader; indeed, it has been left behind.
I exploredigital diplomacyasa “disruptive technology”and
look at criteria for organizational adaptation. I then use
these criteria to assess South Korea's adaptation and draw
fromthesethespecificpolicychallengesfacingSouthKorea.
To conclude, I propose four core criteria to aid digital diplo-
macy adaptation in South Korea and other similar states.
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ministry1 | INTRODUCTION
In January 2018, Bloomberg ranked South Korea as the globe's most innovative economy (Jung,
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ROBERTSON 673globe's third most developed state for e‐government (United Nations, 2016). For the last 10 years,
international organizations including the International Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and the International Telecommunications Union have consistently
ranked South Korea at the top levels (often number 1) for internet connectivity, internet speed,
smartphone ownership, and social media usage.
For all intents and purposes, South Korea is a digital society. South Korea should be a leader
in digital diplomacy—the application of digital technologies to the pursuit of diplomatic objec-
tives, but it is not. Indeed, despite its impressive innovation and technology statistics, South
Korea lags behind competitors in digital diplomacy.
The South Korean case draws interest as it suggests there is more to digital diplomacy than
simply innovation and technology. What distinct challenges have prevented South Korea from
adapting to digital diplomacy; what do these distinct challenges tell us about organizational
adaptation to digital diplomacy; and could similar challenges also impact other states? The
South Korean case could provide insight into the reasons some countries have jumped ahead,
whereas others have lagged behind in digital diplomacy.
To answer these questions, I first explore digital diplomacy in the context of technology
adoption in public organizations. I use an established criterion for technology adaption in public
organizations to assess the case study of South Korea. I then propose four core organizational
changes that could aid digital diplomacy adaptation in South Korea and other similar states. I
conclude by commenting on how culture matters in digital diplomacy.2 | DIGITAL DIPLOMACY AS A DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY
Diplomacy—the mediation of estranged social actors—balances continuity and change. Charac-
teristics such as ceremony, secrecy, status, hierarchy, and inviolability that facilitate mediation
stretch back to the earliest incarnations of diplomacy. Yet, at the same time, diplomacy con-
stantly evolves with new actors, societal changes, innovations, and technologies. Technological
advances, such as the telegraph, radio, computer, air travel, and satellite communications, affect
constraints on policy action caused by time, distance, and information. They narrow the
timeframe for diplomatic decision‐making and implementation. Importantly, they also directly
challenge the characteristics of ceremony, secrecy, status, hierarchy, and inviolability that facil-
itate mediation and can thus push evolutionary or in certain circumstances revolutionary
change in diplomatic practice.
Diplomacy can be thought to consist of four broad tasks—representation, negotiation,
reporting, and the protection of nationals abroad (Robertson, 2016, p. 21–24). Digital diplomacy
relates to the application of digital technologies, including information and communication
technologies (ICTs), software engineering and big data, and artificial intelligence, to the pursuit
of these tasks. To date, research has focused predominantly on how ICTs and software engineer-
ing and big data, as well as early forms of artificial intelligence, coalesce in the social media
environment. As a result, the subfield of public diplomacy—the capacity to communicate with
and influence foreign publics—attracts the most attention. Specifically, such research focuses on
how social media facilitates or changes public diplomacy by enhancing the state's capacity to
communicate, interact, and persuade foreign publics (Manor, 2016). As more states recognize
the importance of digital diplomacy to avoid competitive disadvantage, research on how organi-
zations—specifically foreign ministries—adapt to digital diplomacy is also a growing subject for
research (Bátora, 2008; Hocking, Melissen, Riordan, & Sharp, 2012; Holmes, 2015, p. 13–33).
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ruptive” (National Research Council, 2010, p. 11). Sustaining technologies improve practices. In
the short‐term, they can disrupt the status quo, but through trickle down effects, ultimately
have a minimal impact on existing hierarchies. In the context of diplomacy, this implies that
digital diplomacy would allow early adapters to secure a competitive advantage in the short‐
term and equally would impose competitive disadvantage on late adapters in the short‐term.
Disruptive technologies are distinguished from sustaining technologies by their lack of impact
in the short‐term and substantial impact in the long‐term, including the capacity to upset or rad-
ically transform the existing status quo. In the context of diplomacy, this implies that leading
organizations would neglect, underrate, misunderstand, or be unable to adapt to digital diplo-
macy in the short‐term and would suffer competitive disadvantage in the long‐term.
Organizational responses to both emerging and disruptive technologies can take three broad
forms: organizations can adapt to the technological change and implement strategies to avoid
competitive disadvantage, exploit the technological change and secure competitive advantage,
or avoid (and resist) the technological change and face the risk of competitive disadvantage.
There are three broad factors that determine an organization's capacity to adapt, exploit, or
avoid technological change.
First, an organization must have access to the necessary infrastructure or hardware to utilize
the technology. Reflecting this, adapting to digital diplomacy is obviouslymore difficult for the for-
eign ministries of states with only limited access to critical internet infrastructure, such as copper,
fiber optic and/or satellite links, routing, and associated software services. Additionally, a state
must have adequate human resources and societal acceptance to adapt to the digital environment.
Second, an organization must have management and administrative structures in place that
facilitate adaptation to new technology. This includes structures, such as adequate financial man-
agement to demonstrate an ideal cost–benefit analysis, communication and dispersion conduits,
and an adaptive organizational culture (Steers, Meyer, & Sanchez‐Runde, 2008, p. 256; Lee, Trimi,
& Kim, 2013, p. 22–24). Reflecting this, adapting to digital diplomacy is more difficult for the for-
eign ministries of states with highly conservative foreign ministries that maintain structures that
reinforce diplomatic norms of patience, refrain, exclusivity, secrecy, status, and hierarchy.
Finally, there must be supportive attitudes towards technology and the organization's capac-
ity to adapt within an organization. This includes broadly supportive leadership and individual
willingness to follow and adapt to different practices.
The above present the means to assess a foreign ministry's capacity to exploit digital diplo-
macy. To assess the capacity of a foreign ministry to exploit digital diplomacy it is necessary
to (1) assess national infrastructure and hardware; (2) assess foreign ministry management
and administrative structures; and (3) assess individual attitudes within the foreign ministry
towards technology and organizational capacity.3 | CASE STUDY: SOUTH KOREA
Assessing how foreign ministries adapt to digital diplomacy can be difficult. It requires
privileged access, which in systems with a shorter history of openness and public access can
prove very difficult. Importantly, it also requires a willingness to criticize—something that does
not always coalesce with privileged access. Perhaps for this reason, there is no in‐depth research
on the capacity of South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to adapt to digital diplo-
macy. Relevant research to date looks at South Korea in the context of e‐government and public
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much broader survey of the field of digital diplomacy (Kang, 2009; Kim, 2012; Lee & Melissen,
2011; Melissen & Sohn, 2016; Snow & Taylor, 2009). The only study that looks directly at South
Korea's digital diplomacy provides an introduction to the case but does not critically assess tech-
nology adoption within MOFA itself (Melissen & de Keulenaar, 2017, p. 294–297). This study is
based on a series of interviews undertaken with MOFA personnel from January 2017 to Decem-
ber 2017, accumulating to just under 23 interview hours. Reflecting the context of respondents,
the research maintained strict confidentiality with all identifying material removed. Respon-
dents included three senior, two midranking, and seven junior level officials, working within
the ministry or on posting, across different bureaus (including rotation between bureaus during
the interview period).
Academics debate the effectiveness of commonly utilized social media metrics in the assess-
ment of digital diplomacy (Spry, 2016). Although individually unreliable, they can together give
an indication of the status of progress (or lack of progress) in adapting to the digital diplomacy
environment. These metrics include social media platforms (number of platforms and uptake of
new platforms); individual social media platform account metrics (number of followers, sharing,
replies, etc.); individual social media platform account qualitative metrics (best practice in plat-
form social media usage); and digital diplomacy policy communication (strategic policy docu-
ments, speeches, etc.).
As of January 2018, South Korea's MOFA utilized Facebook, Naver Blog, Twitter, and
YouTube. Importantly, it has no central web platform from which individual accounts are coor-
dinated. Uptake of new and/or alternative platforms has been slow, and diplomatic post
accounts vary considerably between regular local language engagement to only Korean lan-
guage or a total absence of accounts. MOFA does have a separate public diplomacy website with
widgets promoting public diplomacy social media accounts. However, these social media
accounts are “public diplomacy” accounts, which are strangely separate from MOFA. Further,
with links predominantly in the Korean language, the “public diplomacy” accounts are focused
more on connecting with the South Korean public than influencing foreign publics.
Australia serves as a contrast. Similar to South Korea, Australia was slow to adapt to the use
of the digital sphere in diplomacy yet made progress through a coordinated strategic plan to pro-
mote organizational change. Australia has a user‐friendly central website, with multiple links to
recent news events and core programs, as well as a ministry hosted central blog. It has a social
media page that lists all agency, program, and individual social media accounts (DFAT, 2018).
This includes multiple accounts on various platforms, including Facebook, Instagram,
YouTube, Flickr, and LinkedIn, as well as regionally important platforms, such as Sina WeiBo,
Renmin Weibo, Youku, WeChat, and SoundCloud. Accounts are regionally directed and utilize
local languages and social media characteristics. While there is clearly an effort to engage the
Australian public, there remains a clear focus on influencing foreign publics.
Individual social media platform account metrics are unreliable. They rarely provide suffi-
cient information and are known to be easily manipulated. However, in contrast with like‐
minded states, social media platform account metrics do indicate specific deficiencies in the
South Korea's strategy. Taking Australia and Twitter as an example, as of April 2018, Australia's
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has posted 18.9 thousand times, has 69.4 thousand fol-
lowers, and has liked (a form of interaction) 7,132 other users' posts. In contrast, as of April
2018, South Korea's MOFA has posted 3,743 times; has 12.5 thousand followers; and has liked
four other users' posts—thus demonstrating either a lack of interest or unwillingness to engage.
Importantly, there is also an important contrast to be made with MOFA's Korean language
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has 193 thousand followers, and has liked 224 other users' posts. Once again, demonstrating a
focus more on connecting with the South Korean public than influencing foreign publics.
Qualitative metrics focus on best practice in the use of social media platforms. Again, taking
Australia and Twitter as examples, best practice utilizes a combination of imagery and text,
hashtags, links, and callouts, as well as polls, community interaction, and selective user engage-
ment. Examples can be found in most Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Twitter posts (DFAT, 2011). Prior to February 2018, the majority of MOFA's Twitter posts
consisted of a single sentence with a link to a black and white MOFA website page with an
unofficial speech or statement translation. When images were used, they consisted of standard,
formal handshakes or gift exchanges; “two‐tribe” interaction at a negotiating tables; or podium
position presentations—with text devoid of the broader policy context. Since February 2018,
they have adapted to best practice with combined text and image; contextual and candid images
rather than standard, formal images; and more user engagement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2010). The same applies to all distinct social media platforms.
The final commonly utilized digital diplomacy metrics is digital diplomacy policy communi-
cation. While South Korea has demonstrated significant outreach to the policy community, it is
yet to promulgate a specific digital media strategy. In contrast, Australia, the United Kingdom,
Spain, Israel, Singapore, France, Poland, and Japan have all included digital media in publicly
available strategies (Adesina, 2017, p. 7–9).
Accordingly, reflecting the above, South Korea does remain significantly behind comparable
states in the use of digital media. However, a note of caution on this claim must be made. There
is a clear distinction between MOFA's Korean and English language digital diplomacy metrics.
South Korea is significantly more advanced in the use of social media to connect and engage
with Korean speakers. The problem is that native speakers or those that have spent years learn-
ing Korean already love Korea. While public outreach is important, it is not public diplomacy.
Preaching to the converted wastes funds that could be used to influence, engage, or persuade
foreign audiences. This could potentially be explained by the South Korean interpretation of
public diplomacy. Officials express an understanding that public diplomacy is as much about
connecting to, and engaging with the domestic audience rather than engaging or persuading
foreign audiences. This has become an even more focused policy concern with the Moon Jae‐
in administration, which has taken steps to engage the domestic public through kukmin waegyo,
literally “people's diplomacy” or better translated as “citizen diplomacy.” Accountability to the
public has thus become an abiding concern of the current government reflected in both policy
and budget terms. Accordingly, it could be argued that South Korea manages and perhaps even
excels in digital public outreach, but has limited interest in, and thus demonstrates limited suc-
cess in digital public diplomacy.
To assess the capacity of a foreign ministry to exploit digital diplomacy, it is necessary to (a)
assess national infrastructure and hardware, (b) assess foreign ministry management and
administrative structures; and (c) assess individual attitudes within the foreign ministry towards
technology and organizational capacity.3.1 | Infrastructure and hardware
South Korea undoubtedly has the necessary infrastructure and hardware to utilize digital tech-
nology. In international rankings, South Korea is a leader in all things digital: ICT access, use,
and skills (International Telecommunications Union); ICT research and development (OECD);
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in the region, has the necessary infrastructure and hardware to utilize digital diplomacy.
Indeed, South Korea is ahead of most states currently adapting or even exploiting digital
diplomacy.
However, South Korea's technological leadership may itself present a problem. The South
Korean digital environment does not seamlessly integrate into the global digital environment.
Social media in South Korea started earlier than Facebook or Twitter. South Korea's Cyworld
—a uniquely Korean interactive social media platform—was launched in 1999, compared with
Facebook's 2004 or Twitter's 2006. As Cyworld fell from favor, Kakao Talk took over. Kakao
today maintains multiple platforms including blogging, maps, gaming, payments, and transpor-
tation. Interaction on platforms such as Kakao are based on existing “real life” social networks,
as opposed to the creation or establishment of new social networks, such as on Facebook or
Twitter.
Thus, like certain other countries, South Korea has followed a different social media path
that either complements, supplements, or for the younger generation, even replaces mainstream
platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter. While individual officers within MOFA are avid and
often highly regular users of digital technology, they use platforms that are more private, insu-
lar, and separated from the foreign publics with which they should be engaging.3.2 | Foreign ministry management and administrative structures
MOFA was the first ministry of state to be established with the promulgation of the Republic of
Korea in July 1948. From an early stage, MOFA needed established networks and language
skills and was therefore staffed with highly educated, socially elite individuals. Early recruit-
ment segued into an established pattern of recruitment from South Korea's top universities.
MOFA thus inherited a degree of social elitism and an associated conservative bent. Institu-
tional conservatism runs through South Korea's foreign ministry.
In a narrow sense, conservatism connotes a preference for existing institutions, a preference
for tradition, and a disposition towards moderation and caution—none of which are conducive
to transformation and change (Wilson, 2013, p. 13). Conservatism sustains a culture poorly
suited to innovation and adaptation necessary to succeed in the digital environment. In MOFA,
this can be seen in attitudes to secrecy, elitism, and individual initiative.
First, secrecy reduces the willingness of the organization to open itself to technology, which
inherently presents a security risk. The early struggle for political legitimacy as one half of a
divided nation and the ongoing security threat presented by North Korea, inevitably placed a
high premium on secrecy in South Korean government agencies.
Second, elitism reduces the willingness of the organization to accept outside assistance and
advice. South Korea's public administration inherits a degree of Confucian scholarly aloofness
and the public recognizes the diplomatic role as a privileged position. For South Korea's MOFA,
tradition dictates that problems should be resolved within the organization (Interviews, Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, 2017).
Finally, the risk averse culture discourages individual initiative, risk‐taking, and mistake
making—all of which are an inherent part of digital culture. The use of social media by dip-
lomats serves as an example. Privately, social media is everywhere in South Korea. But in an
official capacity, very few South Korean diplomats use social media. They view it as unneces-
sarily risky and are fearful of mistakes (Interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). Addi-
tionally, communicating with the public is not seen as part of a “diplomat's job”
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public relations officer. Communicating directly with the public means taking risk and
accepting that mistakes will be made.
South Korea also faces one more significant challenge to organizational change—bureau-
cracy. The South Korean constitution limits presidential administrations to a single 5‐year term.
When combined with senior political appointments in line departments, South Korea's political
system encourages short‐term advantage rather than medium to long‐term strategic planning
(Robertson, 2017, p. 1–9). For this reason, policy initiatives can lack continuity between admin-
istrations, reflect domestic political prerogatives, and incline towards public demonstration
rather than public administration. At the same time, this can be a substantial benefit to trans-
formational change. If change is imposed from above, the likelihood of it being pushed
through—albeit sometimes rushed through within 5 years—greatly increases.3.3 | Individual attitudes towards technology and the organizational
capacity
In South Korea's foreign ministry, the older generation entered the foreign service soon after the
democratization period of the late 1980s. They often entered as a result of a privileged position
in society, had studied at one of the top three Korean universities, were distinct because of their
experience overseas (at a time when fewer South Koreans traveled overseas), or had connections
that paved a way to a career in diplomacy. When they entered, the foreign ministry acted as a
secondary appendage to the presidential office, and pursued only two core objectives: securing
further economic development and demonstrating legitimacy as the representative of the
Korean people vis‐à‐vis North Korea (Robertson, 2016, p. 165).
At the younger levels are those who entered well after the democratization period. They
entered by passing a stricter foreign ministry civil service exam, through lateral entry via
another ministry or more recently by gaining entry and surviving a year in the Korea National
Diplomatic Academy (KNDA). The generation is more cosmopolitan, more confident in second
and third languages, has a more varied educational background, more open to change, and less
socially conservative (Robertson, 2016, p. 166). Since they've entered, the foreign ministry has
secured a greater voice in the bureaucracy, built its own constituency in overseas and travelling
Koreans, and greatly diversified its objectives to include global governance, regionalism, public
diplomacy, human rights, humanitarian affairs, green growth, and development, to name but a
few (Interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).
While there are exceptions, the generational divide becomes most apparent in attitudes to
innovation and change—including digital diplomacy. The older generation remains wed to a
centralized structure that sees English language social media platforms run in the same way
as faxes from the 1980s—authoritative, black and white boring, monolingual, unidirectional,
and unengaging. The younger generation are avid users of social media, are at ease engaging
on domestic and international platforms, but remain reluctant to do so openly for fear of
attracting the scorn of seniors in the foreign ministry.
Junior officers, who are naturally predisposed to social media in their personal lives are dis-
couraged from transforming these habits into a professional capacity. A good contrast can be
made with Israel. Cadets in Israel's MOFA undertake intensive social media training, which
essentially transforms them into a young and vibrant cadre of prolific social media actors. They
are a friendly, smiling, talkative, and helpful face of Israel across all mainstream social media
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digital environment.
This generational divide has led to a high degree of scepticism regarding the capacity of
MOFA to transform itself (Interviews, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). The capacity of junior
officers to capitalize on the current popularity of Korean culture, including television dramas,
movies, K‐pop, cuisine, and literature is constrained by organizational culture. Through digital
diplomacy transformation, South Korea's public diplomacy could be substantially more
effective.4 | CATCHING UP IN DIGITAL DIPLOMACY
Reflecting the above, there are clear challenges to South Korea's organizational adaptation to
digital diplomacy. First, despite having the necessary infrastructure and hardware to utilize dig-
ital technology, the South Korean digital environment does not seamlessly integrate into the
global digital environment. This represents a challenge in the short‐term in the context of social
media and public diplomacy but has no impact in the longer‐term in the context of big data and
artificial intelligence. Second, South Korea faces significant hurdles as a result of its foreign
ministry management and administrative structures. This includes a highly conservative organi-
zational culture of secrecy, elitism, and hierarchy, as well as fundamental structural constraints
in its constitutional and bureaucratic capacity. Finally, individual attitudes towards technology
and the organizational capacity are currently bifurcated between an older and younger genera-
tion of officials, with the organizational culture of hierarchy reinforcing negative attitudes
towards the capacity to reform.
South Korea is typical of other countries in the region, which face similar challenges in orga-
nizational adaption to digital diplomacy. It has strengths in infrastructure and hardware, but
challenges in foreign policy management and administrative structures, and individual attitudes
towards technology and organizational capacity. Melissen and Hocking, 2015, p. 49–50 propose
four core organizational factors that aid in the implementation of a digital diplomacy strategy:
internal structures, the presence of effective “digital champions,” the development of new roles
and skills, and establishment of rules and risk management. These strategies point a way for-
ward for South Korea.
First, changes to internal structures must be made to shake off traditions that impede tech-
nological adaptation. This can occur naturally through civil‐service best practice, including
transparency, representativeness, and accountability. MOFA is in the process of transformation,
becoming more representative of broader South Korean society, and shaking off the conserva-
tism that constrains adaption to digital diplomacy. This can be seen on multiple fronts that
together transform MOFA's culture.
For the last 5 years, an increasing number of females have entered into senior positions; over
the last 3 years, more female than male candidates have graduated from the KNDA; and most
recently, in June 2017, South Korea's president, Moon Jae‐in, appointed the nation's first ever
female Foreign Minister, Kang Kyung‐wha. In 2015, the number of female officials rose by
64% among fifth‐grade civil servants and 72% among seventh‐grade civil servants (MOFA,
2017, p. 437). Female officials currently play a greater role in MOFA compared with other South
Korean government departments (MOFA, 2017, p. 437). Similarly, the dominance of South
Korea's elite universities in recruitment has diminished to allow a broader and more represen-
tative cadre of junior staff. At the same time, horizontal movement between the foreign ministry
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(MOFA, 2017, p. 437). These changes, which previously separated MOFA from broader South
Korean society, break down internal structural barriers to change.
The most significant means to strengthen internal structures to adapt to technological
change would be the establishment of establish an Office for Innovation and Best Practice
within MOFA. There are currently programs underway in different countries seeking to adapt
to the fast‐changing international environment. These include efforts to reorganize the tradi-
tional balance between geographic and thematic desks within the foreign ministry, to reconsti-
tute consular affairs into a whole‐of‐government ad hoc task‐force structure, to privatize and/or
to share with partner countries specific components of the consular and reporting functions,
and to better utilize digital technologies. A foreign ministry office with a strong mandate to
research, recommend, and oversee the implementation of innovation and best practice would
ensure that South Korea does not miss out on evolving or revolutionary opportunities to
improve policy and practice.
Second, MOFA must encourage effective “digital champions.” Digital champions are senior
officers who utilize digital technology and present an example to midranking and junior offi-
cers. At the political level, an example of a digital champion is the Australian Foreign Minister,
Julie Bishop, whose interaction on social media is consistent and constant (Bishop, 2009). At the
senior officer level, Israel's Ambassador Yuval Rotem serves as an example (Rotem, 2016).
Ambassador Rotem's account demonstrates how an individual can narrate their lives online
in a way that facilitates ministry aims. In a conservative, hierarchical, and collectivist organiza-
tional culture, digital champions present the most effective means to encourage midranking and
junior officers.
Third, MOFA must seek to ensure the development of new roles and skills is prioritized. The
use of digital technologies does require an investment in education and skills training. For
example, to use social media effectively, it requires more than simply encouraging officers to uti-
lize the tools of social media. It also requires individual training to understand how social media
works, organizational training to understand how to maximize impact from organizational
standpoint, and even strategic planning to understand how an organization's use of social media
connects and works with other like‐minded organizations. Essentially, the most effective use of
social media requires a whole‐of‐government strategy.
At an individual level, this needs to commence on recruitment. A graduate from the KNDA
spends about 3 years at the ministry before undertaking a posting (although it is possible after
two). This means that after training at KNDA they would have a solid period of “apprentice-
ship” in digital diplomacy before heading to post. With pre‐post language training including
components on local social media platforms, they would be more than ready to take on the
responsibility of an embassy's digital diplomacy. With the correct training and guidelines, year
upon year, every graduating cadet class would strengthen South Korea's ability to influence
online foreign policy narratives. By the third year, the generation gap in digital diplomacy
would be working in South Korea's favor.
Finally, there is the establishment of rules and risk management procedures. There is an
inherent risk in digital diplomacy. The grey area between an individual's personal and profes-
sional life presents security risks; the inexperience or over‐exuberance of new users presents
publicity risks; and the decentralization and individualization of public communication pre-
sents management risks. Inevitably, mistakes will be made. Yet, by exploiting the generation
gap, most of these mistakes would be made by cadets. If managed well, such mistakes have min-
imal impact and are ultimately excusable and acceptable. In a learning organization, these
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more senior officers' use of social media.5 | CONCLUSION: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE MATTERS
South Korea ranks 13th globally and ninth in the OECD with a total of 172 overseas diplomatic
posts, which far outstrips more traditional middle powers of Australia (110), Sweden (104),
Netherlands (143), and Canada (146). For the 2017 financial year, MOFA's budget is
KRW2,224 billion, which accounts for 0.8% of South Korea's total government budget. It is inex-
cusable for South Korea to be left behind in digital diplomacy. South Korea should be a leader in
the use of digital technologies in diplomatic practice.
This research demonstrates that organizational culture matters in digital diplomacy. It can
have deleterious effects on the capacity of an organization to rapidly adapt to the use of digital
media. Conservatism can reinforce traditions, which in diplomacy emphasize moderation, cau-
tion, secrecy, and elitism, whereas social attitudes, such as collectivism, status, and security con-
sciousness, can reduce willingness to push for change. Equally, this research demonstrates that
culture does not have to be thought of as an impossible hurdle. Organizational transformation
to adapt to digital diplomacy can occur naturally through modern civil‐service best practice to
promote transparency, representativeness, and accountability. Importantly, it can also be over-
come through more tailored initiatives, such as the establishment of an office of best practice,
the use of digital champions, and structured internal training at junior, midcareer, and senior
levels.ORCID
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